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Abstract
We augment LP with a strong conditional operator, to yield a logic we
call “strong LP,” or LP⇒. The resulting logic can speak of consistency in
more discriminating ways, but introduces new possibilities for trivializing
paradoxes.
1 Introduction
A popular paraconsistent logic is the logic LP (“Logic of Paradox”), introduced
by Asenjo [1966] and discussed, e.g., in Priest [1979], Priest [1984], and Priest
[2002]. The idea behind LP is to take classical logic’s two-valued semantics and
extend it to a three-valued semantics, with truth values true (⊤), false (⊥), and
paradoxical (+). We think of the third truth value as meaning “both true and
false.” We extend the classical truth tables as in Table 1.
Why are the truth tables defined as they are? One natural way to answer is
to give an equivalent definition, to be found e.g. in Priest [2002]. Let us define
⊤ = 1,+ = .5,⊥ = 0. Then we may define a∧ b = min{a, b}, a∨ b = max{a, b},
and ¬a = 1−a. This definition hopefully shows some of the symmetries present
in the definition.
¬
⊤ ⊥
+ +
⊥ ⊤
∧ ⊤ + ⊥
⊤ ⊤ + ⊥
+ + + ⊥
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
∨ ⊤ + ⊥
⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤
+ ⊤ + +
⊥ ⊤ + ⊥
→ ⊤ + ⊥
⊤ ⊤ + ⊥
+ ⊤ + +
⊥ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤
↔ ⊤ + ⊥
⊤ ⊤ + ⊥
+ + + +
⊥ ⊥ + ⊤
Table 1: Truth tables for LP’s logical operators.
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LP validates all classical tautologies; however, it fails to validate all classical
inferences. [Priest, 2002] In particular, modus ponens fails; p→ q, p 2 q. This,
arguably, forms a serious obstacle to using LP for much of anything. But LP is
a very simple and intuitive proposal, and the obstacle has not made researchers
give up on it. Various ways around the problem have been proposed.
Priest [1991] proposes a system called “minimally inconsistent LP,” or LPm,
wherein we restrict our attention to “minimally inconsistent” models: essen-
tially, models which satisfy as few contradictions as possible. Then we say that
T |= U iff every minimally inconsistent model of T satisfies U . This lets us re-
cover all techniques of classical reasoning in the consistent case. Crabbe` [2013]
has recently done some important work on this theory.
Beall [2011] proposes another solution. Beall defines a system called “multi-
ple conclusion LP,” wherein we say that T satisfies U iff there is no interpretation
which values all members of T as ⊤ or +, and values all members of U as ⊥. The
idea is that the set of conclusions represents a set of alternatives. We interpret
p, p → q |= q, p ∧ ¬p, q ∧ ¬q as meaning “if p and p → q, then either q, or one
of our premises is inconsistent.” This lets us get back classical logic by adding
appropriate contradictions to our set of alternative conclusions.
A third solution, due to Beall [2013], is to add rules of the form p ⊢ ⊥,
called “shrieks,” where such a rule expresses that p is not a theorem, up to
triviality. This gives a way to say that a theorem is “true and not false,” or
non-paradoxically true; we just assert p and ¬p ⊢ ⊥. Then all forms of classical
reasoning become valid when we are talking about shrieked propositions.
The solution we use here is to augment LP with a new logical operator. It
is an alternative form of implication, which we call “strong implication,” and
write ⇒. It has the following truth table:
⇒ ⊤ + ⊥
⊤ ⊤ ⊥ ⊥
+ ⊤ ⊤ ⊥
⊥ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤
In the real number interpretation of truth values, we define
a⇒ b =
{
1 a ≤ b
0 a > b.
We refer to LP augmented with the strong implication operator as “strong
LP,” or LP⇒. This operator has a number of nice properties, which we shall
discuss in Section 3. It implements modus ponens. Its addition makes LP⇒
functionally complete. It obeys contraction and contraposition, allows a form
of proof by contradiction, and obeys restricted forms of weakening and the
deduction theorem. The biconditional p ⇔ q is true just in case p and q have
the same truth value.
A further nice property of LP⇒ is that we can reproduce classical logic in
it. As discussed in Section 3, if an LP⇒ theory has only consistent models,
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p⊤ p+ p⊥ p>⊥ pcon
⊤ ⇒ p p⇔ + p⇒ ⊥ +⇒ p p⇒ p⊤
(1)
Table 2: Definitions of extended unary operators.
⇒ ⊤ + ⊥
⊤ ⊤ ⊥ ⊥
+ ⊤ ⊤ ⊥
⊥ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤
⇔ ⊤ + ⊥
⊤ ⊤ ⊥ ⊥
+ ⊥ ⊤ ⊥
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊤
p p⊤
⊤ ⊤
+ ⊥
⊥ ⊥
p p+
⊤ ⊥
+ ⊤
⊥ ⊥
p p⊥
⊤ ⊥
+ ⊥
⊥ ⊤
p p>⊥
⊤ ⊤
+ ⊤
⊥ ⊥
p pcon
⊤ ⊤
+ ⊥
⊥ ⊤
(2)
Table 3: Truth tables for extended logical operators.
then its LP⇒ consequences are precisely its classical consequences; and, if an
LP⇒ theory has a consistent model, then we can add to it a nontrivializing
axiom schema which makes its LP⇒ consequences become exactly its classical
consequences.
Additionally, we can use ⇒ to define a number of other useful logical oper-
ators. These operators let us talk about inconsistency in very fine and discrim-
inating ways. We can express that a statement is non-paradoxically true; that
a statement is either true or paradoxical, but not false; and so forth.
The first operators are p⊤ (“p is true”), p+ (“p is paradoxical”), and p⊥ (“p
is false”). These operators yield true if p has the superscripted truth value, and
false otherwise. We also define p>⊥ (“p is not false”), which is true unless p is
non-paradoxically false, and pcon (“p is consistent”), which yields true unless p
is paradoxical. The truth tables of these operators are given in Table 3 (along
with the truth table for ⇒, for comparison). Table 2 states how they may be
defined in terms of ⇒. The possibility of defining these operators shows that
⇒ adds a great deal of power to the language. But in a sense, it adds too much
power, as we shall now see.
The idea of augmenting LP with additional logical connectives is not a new
one; see, e.g., Denyer [1989] and Priest [1989]. Researchers have largely rejected
it, because when combined with tools of self reference such as the T -schema
or the na¨ıve comprehension schema, it tends to yield paradoxes which lead to
triviality. For instance, define the following variation of the Russell set:
R = {x : (x ∈ x)⊥}. (3)
The statement R ∈ R for this “super-Russell” set gives us a more vicious
type of paradox, which is trivializing in LP⇒, as the reader may verify. A
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similar, Curry-like paradox arises if we set up a T -schema in LP⇒.
In the set-theoretic case, the simple solution is to disallow the use of ⇒
inside set-builders. This is undoubtedly a sacrifice, but prime facie appears to
leave us with a usable set theory. In the case of the T -schema, such a restriction
would seem to contradict the very point of the schema, and so we can only say
that LP⇒ is not an appropriate setting for such a schema.
2 The logic LP⇒
We proceed with defining LP⇒. We assume the usual definition of signatures,
with constant and relation symbols but no function symbols. We assume an
infinite set V of variable names. Terms are variables or constants. We let
τ, υ, ... denote terms. Atomic formulas are logical constants (⊤,+,⊥), relations
R(τ1, ..., τn), or equalities τ = υ. Formulas are built up from atomic formu-
las using the connectives ¬,∧,⇒ and quantifiers ∀x(φ). We let ∨,→,↔, ∃ be
defined in terms of ¬,∧, ∀ in the usual way. We let φ, ψ, ζ, ... denote formulas.
Definition 1. A “model” is a pair (M, I) associated with a signature, where:
1. M is a nonempty set (the universe of objects).
2. I is the interpretation function, giving interpretations to constant and
relation symbols. Its domain consists of all constant and relation symbols
in the signature.
3. For each constant symbol c in the signature, I(c) ∈M is an object.
4. For each n-ary relation symbol R in the signature, I(R) : Mn → 3 is an
n-ary three-valued relation onM . Using currying notation, we abbreviate
I(R)(y1, ..., yn) to I(R, y1, ..., yn).
Informally, we refer to the pair (M, I) as just M .
Definition 2. If (M, I) is a model, we say that (M, I) is “consistent” iff, for
every relation R in the signature, the image of I(R) does not contain +.
Definition 3. A “variable assignment” A for a model M is a function A : V →
M which gives values to the variables.
Definition 4. Given a model (M, I) and a variable assignment A, we define
the valuation function valMA from terms to objects as follows. We omit the
superscript and subscript where unamibiguous.
1. val(c) = I(c), where c is a constant symbol in M ’s signature.
2. val(x) = A(x), where x ∈ V is a variable.
Definition 5. Given a model M and a variable assignment A, we define the
truth function TMA (φ) from formulas to truth values as follows. We omit the
superscript and subscript where unambiguous.
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1. T(R(τ1, ..., τn)) = I(R, val(τ1), ..., val(τn)).
2. T(τ = υ) =
{
⊤ if val(τ) = val(υ);
⊥ otherwise.
3. T(¬φ) = ¬T(φ).
4. T(φ ∧ ψ) = T(φ) ∧ T(ψ).
5. T(φ⇒ ψ) = T(φ)⇒ T(ψ).
6. TA(∀x(φ)) =
∧
y∈M
TA[x 7→y](φ).
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Definition 6. Given theories T, U , a model M , and a variable assignment A,
we say:
1. M,A |= T iff TMA (φ) > ⊥ for all φ ∈ T .
2. M |= T iff M,A |= T for all variable assignments A. |= T iff M |= T for
all models M in the signature of T .
3. T |= U iff, for all models M , if M,A |= T for all variable assignments A,
then M,A |= U for all variable assignments A.
We shall write T |=⇒ U when we need to be clear that we are talking about
LP⇒ satisfaction, and e.g. write |=cl to denote classical satisfaction.
3 Properties of LP⇒
Unlike classical logic, LP is functionally incomplete, in the sense that not every
truth function f : 3n → 3 may be expressed as a propositional formula of LP.
We prove that LP⇒ is functionally complete, in the same sense.
Theorem 1. LP (with logical constants) is functionally incomplete.
Proof. We claim that the set of truth functions listed in Table 4 is the set of
unary truth functions definable in LP with logical constants. Each is definable
in LP, via the listed formula.
Every atomic propositional formula defines either the identity function or a
constant function; and those are in the table. I wrote a computer program to
check that the negation of a truth function in the table is in the table; and to
check that the conjunction of two truth functions in the table is in the table.
By induction on formulas, this shows that every unary truth function definable
in LP is in the table. But the table contains 10 functions, whereas there are
33 = 27 unary truth functions.
1A[x 7→ y] denotes A modified so that x gets the value y.
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p p
⊤ ⊤
+ +
⊥ ⊥
p p ∨ ¬p
⊤ ⊤
+ +
⊥ ⊤
p ¬p
⊤ ⊥
+ +
⊥ ⊤
p p ∧ ¬p
⊤ ⊥
+ +
⊥ ⊥
p p ∧+
⊤ +
+ +
⊥ ⊥
p ¬p ∨+
⊤ +
+ +
⊥ ⊤
p ¬p ∧+
⊤ ⊥
+ +
⊥ +
p ⊤
⊤ ⊤
+ ⊤
⊥ ⊤
p +
⊤ +
+ +
⊥ +
p ⊥
⊤ ⊥
+ ⊥
⊥ ⊥
Table 4: Unary truth functions definable in LP.
Theorem 2. LP⇒ (with logical constants) is functionally complete.
Proof. Consider a truth function f : 3n → 3. Given any sequence of truth
values v1, ..., vn ∈ 3 (abbreviated (vi)), let u = f(v1, ..., vn) and define
φ(vi)(p1, ..., pn) = (p1 ⇔ v1 ∧ · · · ∧ pn ⇔ vn) ∧ u. (4)
It is easy to see that:
φ(vi)(p1, ..., pn) =
{
u if p1, ..., pn = v1, ..., vn;
⊥ otherwise.
(5)
Now define V as the set of sequences v1, ..., vn ∈ 3, and define
ψ(p1, ..., pn) =
∨
(vi)∈V
φ(vi)(p1, ..., pn). (6)
It is easy to see that for all sequences (vi), ψ(v1, ...vn) = φ(vi)(v1, ..., vn) =
f(v1, ..., vn), since all of the φ’s except for φ(vi) come out to ⊥. It follows that,
for all (vi), ψ(v1, ..., vn) = f(v1, ..., vn). So f is expressible as a propositional
formula of LP⇒.
Now we observe a number of nice rules which ⇒ validates.
Theorem 3. The following are valid in LP⇒:
1. (Modus ponens.) p⇒ q, p |= q.
2. (Contraction.) |= (p⇒ q)⇒ ((p⇒ (q ⇒ r))⇒ (p⇒ r)).
3. (Weakened weakening.) |= p⊤ ⇒ (q ⇒ p).
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4. (Contraposition.) |= (p⇒ q)⇔ (¬q ⇒ ¬p).
5. (Proof by cases.) |= ((p⊤ ⇒ q) ∧ (p+ ⇒ q) ∧ (p⊥ ⇒ q))⇒ q.
6. (Proof by contradiction.) |= (p⇒ (q ∧ q⊥))⇒ p⊥.
Proof. These may be verifed using truth tables.
LP⇒ faithfully preserves classical logic. This is true in at least two senses.
Firstly, if an LP⇒ theory has only consistent models, then its LP⇒ consequences
are precisely its classical consequences. This is trivial to verify, since in this case
the LP⇒ models are precisely the classical models.
Secondly, if an LP⇒ theory T has a consistent model, then we can add to it
a non-trivializing axiom schema U so that the LP⇒ consequences of T ∪ U are
precisely the classical consequences of T . We let
U = {∀x1, ..., xn(R(x1, ..., xn)
con) : R is an n−ary relation in the signature of T }.
T ∪ U has a model, since T has a consistent model M and M |= U . Clearly,
furthermore, every model of T ∪U is consistent; so the consequences of T ∪U are
just the classical consequences of T∪U , which are just the classical consequences
of T , since U is tautologous in classical logic.2
4 Embeddings of classical theories
An intended application of LP⇒ is in constructing inconsistent theories which
prove all the theorems of some classical theory, and none of their negations. For
instance, we might wish to construct an inconsistent set theory which nonethe-
less proves all theorems of ZFC and nothing false in ZFC. Our purpose in this
section is to describe exactly what we mean by that. For this we introduce the
notion of an “embedding.”
Essentially, an embedding is a translation of the formulas of a classical theory
C into the formulas of an LP⇒ theory L. We map each relation R in the
signature of C onto a corresponding predicate ρR in the language of L. We let
the domain of quantification of C be translated as a subdomain of L’s domain
of quantification characterized by a definable class κ(x). This gives rise to a
natural translation of the formulas of C into the formulas of L. Then we require
that L proves all translated theorems of C, and additionally proves that all
translated formulas are consistent. This implies that if L is non-trivial, it does
not prove the translations of any of the negations of the theorems of C.
Definition 7. Let T be an LP⇒ theory, and U a classical theory.
3 An “em-
bedding” of U into T consists of the following things:
2In translating LP⇒ formulas into classical logic, we translate ⇒ as →. So φcon translates
as φ→ (⊤ → φ).
3For simplicity we disallow constant symbols in the signature of U . They may be emulated
using relation symbols.
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1. For each n-ary relation symbol R in the signature of U , an LP⇒ formula
ρR(x1, ..., xn), with x1, ..., xn the free variables. This is the interpretation
of the relation in the language of U .
2. A formula κ(x) in one free variable x. This is intended to define a class of
objects over which quantifiers range in the interpretation of U .
Given a classical formula φ, we define the LP⇒ translation Tr(φ) inductively as
follows:
1. Tr(R(x1, ..., xn)) = ρR(x1, ..., xn).
2. Tr(¬φ) = ¬Tr(φ).
3. Tr(φ ∧ ψ) = Tr(φ) ∧ Tr(ψ).
4. Tr(∀x(φ)) = ∀x(κ(x)⇒ Tr(φ)).
We require that for all formulas φ in the language of U , T |=⇒ Tr(φ)
con, and if
U |=cl φ then T |=⇒ Tr(φ).
5 Go¨delian considerations
In classical logic, consistent theories capable of expressing arithmetic form a
partially ordered set where T < U iff U is capable of proving T consistent. If
T < U , then T does not prove all the theorems of U . LP⇒ theories which embed
classical theories factor into this hierarchy in a certain way: namely, a classical
theory cannot prove nontrivival any LP⇒ theory which embeds the classical
theory.
In the following theorem we assume that an appropriate sound and complete
deduction system has been defined for LP⇒ (which can readily be done). We
write ⊢⇒ for LP⇒ syntactic entailment, and ⊢cl for classical syntactic entail-
ment. Clearly if T ⊢⇒ φ then there is an elementary arithmetical proof that
T ⊢⇒ φ.
Theorem 4. Let T be an LP⇒ theory and U a classical theory capable of
expressing arithmetic, such that there is an embedding E of U into T , and U
proves that E is an embedding. If U is consistent, then U does not prove T
nontrivial.
Proof. Suppose U proves that T is nontrivial. U proves that if U ⊢cl φ
then T ⊢⇒ Tr(φ). If T ⊢⇒ φ ∧ φ
⊥, then T is trivial, and U proves this. So U
proves that for all formulas φ in the language of U , T 0⇒ Tr(φ) ∧ Tr(φ)
⊥. So
U proves that for all classical φ, U 0cl φ ∧ φ
⊥, i.e., U 0cl φ ∧ ¬φ. So U proves
its own consistency.
8
References
Asenjo, F. [1966], ‘A calculus of antinomies’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic 7(1).
Beall, J. [2011], ‘Multiple-conclusion LP and default classicality’, The Review
of Symbolic Logic 4(2).
Beall, J. [2013], ‘Shrieking against gluts: the so-
lution to the ‘just true’ problem’. Available at
http://homepages.uconn.edu/~jcb02005/wip/just-true.pdf.
Crabbe`, M. [2013], ‘Reassurance for the logic of paradox’, Review of Symbolic
Logic . To appear.
Denyer, N. [1989], ‘Dialetheism and trivialization’.
Priest, G. [1979], ‘The Logic of Paradox’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 8(1).
Priest, G. [1984], ‘Logic of Paradox revisited’, Journal of Philosophical Logic
13(2).
Priest, G. [1989], ‘Denyer’s $ not backed by sterling arguments’, Mind 390.
Priest, G. [1991], ‘Minimally Inconsistent LP’, Studia Logica 50(2).
Priest, G. [2002], Paraconsistent logic, in ‘Handbook of Philosophical Logic’,
Vol. 6, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 287–393.
Restall, G. [1992], ‘A note on na¨ıve set theory in LP’, Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic 33(3).
9
